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Abstract—Today’s large-scale enterprise networks, data center
networks, and wide area networks can be decomposed into
multiple administrative or geographical domains. Domains may
be owned by different administrative units or organizations.
Hence protecting domain information is an important con-
cern. Existing general-purpose Secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMPC) methods that preserves privacy for domains are ex-
tremely slow for cross-domain routing problems. In this paper
we present PYCRO, a cryptographic protocol specifically de-
signed for privacy-preserving cross-domain routing optimization
in Software Defined Networking (SDN) environments. PYCRO
provides two fundamental routing functions, policy-compliant
shortest path computing and bandwidth allocation, while ensur-
ing strong protection for the private information of domains. We
rigorously prove the privacy guarantee of our protocol. We have
implemented a prototype system that runs PYCRO on servers in
a campus network. Experimental results using real ISP network
topologies show that PYCRO is very efficient in computation and
communication costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale enterprise networks, data center networks, and
wide area networks (WANs) may be decomposed into multiple
administrative or geographical domains [4], [22], [15], [13],
[23], [21], [1]. Multi-domain networks are deployed to inter-
connect community networks, data centers, corporation sites,
and university campuses. In a multi-domain network such as a
WAN, different domains may belong to different administrative
units with an organization or different organizations [22], [15],
[13], [21], [18], [1]. For example, a number of organizations
may own their own sub-networks, and those subnetworks
are mutually interconnected to form a multi-domain network
[1]. Hence individual domain may have security and privacy
concerns regarding revealing its domain information to other
domains. This paper focuses on multi-domain networks that
consist of a relatively small number of domains, which may
appear in current enterprise networks and WANs. We do not
consider Internet-scale multi-domain networks at this stage.
Routing optimization, such as finding policy-compliant
paths that have least routing cost or satisfy bandwidth de-
mands, plays a critical role of network management. Recent
advances of Software Defined Networking (SDN) has brought
tremendous convenience to routing optimization by separating
the control plane from routers and allowing a central controller
to make routing decisions. Using centralized optimization,
the controller can efficiently and effectively find a desired
routing path for each flow and install forwarding rules on
corresponding switches.1 Although SDN simplifies routing
optimization in a single domain, privacy-preserving cross-
domain routing optimization is still a challenging problem.
Suppose each domain has a centralized controller. The state-
of-the-art approach to route a cross-domain flow is using local
optimization for intra-domain path selection and BGP for inter-
domain routing, such as the design in Google’s SDN B4 [15]
and DISCO [21]. This approach protects the autonomy and
privacy of domains. However, it is obvious that local opti-
mization plus BGP may not find an network-wide optimized
path and can hardly provide bandwidth guarantee. Another
solution is to allow every controller to broadcast its domain
information to the entire network and maintains a network-
wide map, similar to a controller-level OSPF protocol. This
approach causes privacy and security concerns because every
domain has to expose its private information such as network
topology, link latencies, bandwidth, and routing policies. In
fact, there is no practical and privacy-preserving solution to
the most fundamental routing problem, i.e., computing shortest
paths, for multi-domain networks.
Privacy-preserving cross-domain network problems can be
modeled as secure multi-party computation (SMPC) [30],
[2], [4], [14], [16], [19]. However, general-purpose SMPC
solutions such as SEPIA [4] are extremely slow and may take
days to complete [8] [11]. Therefore, customized algorithms
are needed for the privacy-preserving cross-domain routing
problems.
In this paper, we present the first work for privacy-
preserving cross-domain routing optimization that has reason-
able efficiency in practical networks. We design and implement
a protocol named PYCRO and its extensions to provide two
fundamental routing functions, namely policy-compliant short-
est path computing and bandwidth allocation, while protecting
the private information of domains. PYCRO is executed on
SDN controllers in a distributed manner and does not rely on
any trusted third party. PYCRO is developed based on a novel
cryptographic tool called Secure-If operations.
The properties of PYCRO can be summarized as follows.
1) PYCRO can compute policy-compliant cross-domain
shortest paths and allocate bandwidth for flows while protect-
ing private information of domains. The privacy guarantee of
PYCRO is cryptographically strong.(Please see Section VII for
formal analysis of privacy.)
1In this work we refer all network units as “switches” for consistency to
SDN terminology.
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2) PYCRO also preserves the autonomy and local policies
of domains. A domain can independently determine whether
and how to forward different flows and these preferences are
unknown to other domains.
3) PYCRO is efficient in both computation and communi-
cation costs.
PYCRO is the first work of privacy-preserving cross-
domain routing optimization in SDN environments. We have
implemented a prototype system that runs PYCRO on ma-
chines in a campus network. Experimental results using real
ISP network topologies show that PYCRO has reasonably good
efficiency. It spends < 30 seconds and < 700 KB messages
in computing a shortest path tree for networks consisting of
thousands of switches and links.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
the related work in Section II. In Section III, we introduce
the problem overview and background. We presenting the
PYCRO protocol in Section IV, and then introduce some
optimization techniques in Section V. We design the bandwidth
allocation protocol with our PYCRO protocol in Section VI.
In Section VII, we justify the privacy-preserving property
of PYCRO. We evaluate the performance of our protocol in
Section VIII. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving cross-domain routing can be modeled
as a secure multi-party computation (SMPC) problem. Yao’s
seminal work [30] introduces the first algorithm, called Yao’s
garbled circuits, to allow two parties to compute an arbitrary
function with their inputs without revealing private infor-
mation. Since then, many studies about SMPC have been
conducted [2], [4], [14], [16], [19]. In [17], a secure two-
party computation system called Fairplay is introduced and
the system implements generic secure function evaluation.
FairplayMP proposed in [2] supplements the Fairplay sys-
tem. FairplayMP is a generic system for secure multi-party
computation while Fairplay only supports secure two-party
computation. SEPIA [4] is a recently proposed SMPC system
for general inter-domain network applications. A common
limitation of these SMPC solutions is that the computation time
can be way too long for practical applications. For example,
[8] shows that it takes thousands of days to track cross-
domain connectivity of a few domains using SEPIA [4]. An
SMPC-based routing algorithm proposed to replace BGP also
experiences long execution time [11] which makes the existing
SMPC methods impractical for inter-domain routing.
Recently researchers have proposed custom privacy-
preserving algorithms for different network applications. Chen
et al. [5] use Bloom filters to combine access control lists
of multiple domains and determine network reachability in a
privacy-preserving manner. Djatmiko et al. [8] propose to ap-
ply counting Bloom filters for privacy-preserving multi-domain
connectivity tracking. STRIP [12] is a privacy-preserving inter-
domain routing protocol to replace BGP and achieve fast
convergence. To our knowledge, no existing work in this
category studies the privacy-preserving cross-domain routing
optimization problem.
III. PROBLEM OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
In the section, we formalize the problem in this paper and
then introduce a novel cryptographic tool we will use to solve
the problem.
A. Problem Formulation
We formalize the problem to be solve in this paper as
follows.
Consider a large network that consists of N domains: D1,
D2, . . . , DN , where each domain Di has a domain controller
Ci that makes routing decision and updates the forwarding
tables of switches in the domain. A domain controller can
access any information of its domain, including the network
topology, access control policies, link bandwidth, and authen-
ticated hosts. A domain controller can add, delete, and update
forwarding entries of switches in its domain. It communicates
with controllers in other domains via pre-established secure
channels.
For any two switches v, v′ ∈ Di (v 6= v′), we use v ∼
v′ to denote that there is a link between v and v′ and we
denote its link cost by c(vv′). Clearly, each Ci should know
the topology of Di, and should also know all the link costs
within this domain: {c(vv′)|v, v′ ∈ Di, v 6= v′}. We assume
that the intra-domain topology and the intra-domain link costs
are all private information of Ci. That is, any other domain
controller should not know anything about this topology or
these link costs. We assume different domains are managed by
different parties, such as ISPs, organizations, or departments
of a corporation. Parties do not share domain information. If a
party owns multiple physical domains, all these domains can
be considered a single logical domain in this problem.
There are some inter-domain links that connect switches
from different domains. We assume that information about an
inter-domain link is available of the two end domains, and
domains can share it with other domains. That is, for any inter-
domain link vv′ (where v ∈ Di, v′ ∈ Dj and Di 6= Dj), all
domain controllers could know the two endpoints v and v′, and
also Di and Dj—the domains they belong to. A switch that
is connected to switches in other domains is called a gateway
switch. We assume gateway switches are publicly known.
Suppose that there are a source switch vs, which belongs
to a domain Ds, and a destination switch vt, which belongs
to another domain Dt. Our objective is to design a private-
preserving optimized routing solution. Specifically, we need
to design a protocol that allows each domain controller Ci to
find the forwarding table T (v) for all v ∈ Di, where each
entry T (v)[vs, vt] is the next-hop switch of v on the optimal
routing path from the source vs to destination vt.
In this work, PYCRO focuses on two major routing opti-
mization problems.
1) Policy-compliant shortest path routing. Each link has
an associated routing cost (also known as link weight), rep-
resenting a performance metric such as hop count, latency, or
traffic load [28]. The routing object is to find a path from the
source to the destination that has the minimum sum of link
cost without violating policies of domains.
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2) Bandwidth allocation. Bandwidth allocation has been
applied to practical traffic engineering solutions such as B4
[15]. Each flow has a bandwidth demand and link bandwidth
is allocated to different flows. When flows are competing for
bandwidth, a single flow may need multiple paths to satisfy its
bandwidth demand. The routing object is to find one or more
paths for a flow such that the flow bandwidth demand can
be satisfied. At this stage, we do not consider fairness among
flows [15].
Security and Privacy Requirements. Due to security
concerns, a switch only allows its domain controller to install,
delete, or update forwarding table entries. Domains may not
wish to reveal their information including network topology,
link bandwidth, and routing policies. In addition, a domain
should have routing autonomy to determine whether and how
to forward a given flow. This preference should also be made
confidential to other domains.
B. Cryptographic Tool
Here we introduce the cryptographic tool we will use in
this work, namely the Secure-If operation.
Secure-If operation. Our protocol depends on a crypto-
graphic technique developed by us, which we call the Secure-
If operation. This operation allows the protocol to choose
between two options Y and Z , based on whether a partic-
ular condition X is satisfied. Denote by SecIf(X,Y, Z) the
Secure-If operation, and then we have
SecIf [X,Y, Z] =
{
Y, X is satisfied;
Z, otherwise.
(1)
Note that this operation is privacy preserving. It is infeasible
for anybody to decide whether the condition is satisfied or
not, i.e., which of the two options is actually chosen. For
example, suppose that X , Y , Z are ciphertexts; consider a
condition that “X is an encrypted 1”. This operation can return
a rerandomization of Y when the plaintext of X is indeed 1,
and return a rerandomization of Z otherwise. However, nobody
can learn whether the returned value is a rerandomization of
Y or a rerandomization of Z unless the result is decrypted. In
general, the privacy guarantee is that no knowledge about any
plaintext(s) involved is leaked to any party.
The involved conditions may be complicated and thus this
technique itself can depend on other cryptographic building
blocks. For instance, we may need to use the building block of
partial decryption. Suppose that the private key for a ciphertext
is shared among a number of parties using a secret sharing
scheme [24]. Partial decryption allows a party with a share of
the private key to partially decrypt a ciphertext. The partially
decrypted ciphertext does not leak any knowledge about the
plaintext. However, when a threshold number of parties apply
partial decryption one by one, the plaintext will finally be
revealed. Detailed implementation of Secure-If operations are
custom-built and depend on different algorithms.
Also notice that we will use a few variants of this technique
in this paper. Each of these variants is constructed in a distinct
way. Please see Section IV-D for the detailed constructions.
IV. DESIGN OF THE PYCRO PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the PYCRO protocol with three
steps:equivalent cost graph construction, privacy-preserving
shortest path tree protocol and path establishment. In the PY-
CRO protocol, we need two homomorphic encryption systems
E() and E′(), both of which must be semantically secure.
The difference between E() and E′() is that E() must be
additively homomorphic, while E′() must be multiplicative
homomorphic. Specifically, for two messages x and y,
E(x) + E(y) = E(x + y)
E′(x) · E′(y) = E′(xy)
All E() and E′() encryption operations in this paper use a
public key whose corresponding private key is shared among
the domain controllers using (N, 2)-secret sharing. There exist
cryptosystems [9], [27], [25] that are both additively and mul-
tiplicatively homomorphic. However, we do not use them due
to efficiency considerations. We denote by D() and D′() the
corresponding decryption operations, respectively. In addition,
we allow both of them supports re-randomization operations,
and the rerandomization operation is denoted by R() and R′().
As mentioned earlier, another main cryptographic tool we use
in the PYCRO protocol is the Secure-If operation.
A. Equivalent Cost Graph Construction
In this subsetion, we show how to construct the equivalent
cost graph. To construct equivalent cost graph, we first show
the nodes in it and then the links in it.
As for nodes, we define a switch as a significant node if
it is the source switch or a gateway switch and the nodes of
the equivalent cost graph are the significant nodes in the entire
network. We denote by Si the significant node set of domain
Di and we also denote by S the significant node set of all
domains.
As for links, for any two significant nodes v and v′ (v 6=
v′), we distinguish two cases:
Case 1: If v, v′ ∈ Si, then link v ∼ v′ is in the equivalent
cost graph.In this case, the link is called intra-domain link
since two nodes are in the same domain. Note that a intra-
domain link does not necessarily correspond to a physical link,
and could be a multi-hop path between two switches. The path
from v to v′ is selected by Di in the best effort based on
Di’s local policies and is not necessarily the shortest path. If
a domain does not wish to forward f , it sets the path length
as infinity or the pre-defined path length upper limit. We use
d(vv′) to denote the path length assigned by Di.
Case 2: If v ∈ Si ∧ v′ ∈ Sj ∧ Si 6= Sj ∧ v ∼ v′then link
v ∼ v′ is in the equivalent cost graph.In this case, the link
is called inter-domain link since two nodes are in different
domains. We use c(vv′) to denote the length of link v ∼ v′.
As an example, Figure 1(a) shows the equivalent cost graph
of a network consisting of four domains, in the view of the
controller Cs of the source domain Ds. The nodes of the graph
are the source switch vs and all gateway switches v1−7.
Clearly, Cs, the controller of the source domain, knows
the connectivity information of the equivalent cost graph.
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(a) Equivalent cost graph of four domains:
dashed lines are intra-domain links and solid
lines are inter-domain links.
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c(vsv2)=1
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(b) An iteration of PSPT construction
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PSPT rooted at vs
(c) PSPT and path establishment
Figure 1. An illustration of the PYCRO protocol.
Furthermore, for links in Case 2 above, Cs also knows the
link costs in the equivalent cost graph. For links in Case 1
above that are not in Ds, Cs does not know the link costs
in the equivalent cost graph, which are private information of
different domains.
B. Privacy-preserving Shortest Path Tree Protocol
This subsection describes how the source controller com-
putes a Privacy-preserving Shortest Path Tree (PSPT) on the
equivalent cost graph rooted at vs while providing strong
protection for the private information of other domains. We
use cmax to denote the maximum link cost and assume the
length of cryptographic keys in use is much greater than the
length of cmax.
Each domain controller Ci, except the source domain
controller Cs, encrypts all its link costs in Case 1 of the
equivalent cost graph, and sends them to Cs. Specifically, for
any two switches v and v′ in Di (Di 6= Ds), Ci computes
e(vv′) = E(d(vv′)) and sends it to Cs. The source domain
controller Cs needs to encrypts all its link costs in Case
1 of the equivalent cost graph. Cs is also responsible for
encrypting the link costs in Case 2 of the equivalent cost
graph. Specifically, for any v in Di and v′ in Dj , if there is an
inter-domain link between these two nodes, then Ci computes
e(vv′) = E(c(vv′)). For any v, v′ ∈ Ds (v 6= v′), if there is an
intra-domain link between these two nodes, then Ci computes
e(vv′) = E(c(vv′)).
For each node v in the equivalent cost graph, except the
source node itself, Cs computes three indicators: f(v) =
E′(2), g(v) = E(0), and h(v) = E′(φ). Here f(v) is an
encrypted indicator for node v, indicating whether it has been
added to the shorted path tree. We use an encrypted 2 to
represent “No”, and an encrypted 2−1 to represent “Yes”. The
plaintext of g(v) will be used for the length of the shortest path
from the source node to v, once v is added to the shortest path
tree. The plaintext of h(v) will be used to store the information
of the parent node of v in the shortest path tree, once v is added
to the shortest path tree. All these indicators are essential in
the computation of the shortest path tree.
For the source node, Cs computes the three indicators:
f(v) = E′(2−1), g(v) = E(0), and h(v) = E′(φ), because it
is the root of the tree. Then the source controller repeats the
two steps below for |S| − 1 iterations, where S is the set of
nodes in the equivalent cost graph. At each iteration, a node
with the minimum distance to the root among the remaining
nodes is added to the tree.
Step 1. For each link vv′ in the equivalent cost graph, Cs
uses a Secure-If operation (denoted as SecIf0) to compute
α(vv′). The condition here is that the plaintext of f(v) is
equal to the plaintext of f(v′). If this condition is satisfied,
α(vv′) = E(cmax|S| + 1); otherwise, α(vv′) = R(g(v) +
g(v′) + e(vv′))). If the condition is satisfied, it means either
v′ and v are both in the tree or neither in the tree. We just
let α(vv′) be a maximum value and do not consider it. If the
condition is not satisfied, one of v′ and v is in the tree and the
other is not. Then the plaintext of α(vv′) is the distance from
the node not in the tree to the root.
Step 2. For each link vv′ in the equivalent cost graph, Cs
uses a Secure-If operation (denoted as SecIf1) to re-compute
f(v), f(v′), g(v), g(v′), h(v), h(v′). The condition is that the
plaintext of α(vv′) is the smallest among the α values of all
links in the equivalent cost graph. The node not in the tree
that corresponds to the smallest α should be added to the tree
and its three indicators should be updated.
If the condition in Step 2 is satisfied, then we use another
Secure-If operation (denoted as SecIf2) to decide how to
update the indicators. The condition of this new Secure-If
operation is that the plaintext of f(v) is equal to 2, i.e., whether
the node v is not in the tree.
• When the condition is satisfied (v is not in the tree),
f(v) = E′(2−1), g(v) = R(α(vv′)), h(v) = E′(v′).
The indicators of v′ are re-randomized.
• Otherwise, v′ is not in the tree, hence f(v′) =
E′(2−1), g(v′) = R(α(vv′)), h(v′) = E′(v). The
indicators of v are re-randomized.
If the condition in Step 2 is not satisfied, all indicators
f(v), f(v′), g(v), g(v′), h(v), h(v′) are just re-randomized
based on the original values.
We show an example of the above iteration in Figure 1(b).
vs, v1, and v2 are already in the tree. Since v3 is not in the
tree, we compute α(v2v3) = R(g(v2) + g(v3) + e(v2v3))) =
R(E(1) + E(0) + E(2)) = R(E(3)). Suppose the plaintext
of α(v2v3), i.e., 3, is the smallest α value. Then v3 should be
added to the tree. The indicators of v3 are updated as follows:
f(v3) = E
′(2−1), g(v3) = R(E(3)), h(v) = E
′(v2). The
indicators of v2 are all re-randomized.
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The detailed algorithm specification of the PSPT con-
struction protocol is not shown due to space limit. Once the
algorithm is completed, for each v in the equivalent cost
graph, Cs actually obtains the ciphertexts of g(v), the shortest
path length from vs to v, and h(v), the parent of v on
the PSPT. Figure 1(c) shows the constructed PSPT of the
network. With all the g(v) and h(v), we can construct the
path from vs to vt using the method proposed in the next
section (Section IV-C). Note that we use three types of Secure-
If operations (SecIf0, SecIf1 and SecIf2). We will describe
how they are implemented in detail in Section IV-D.
C. Path Establishment
After running the PSPT construction protocol, each domain
controller knows all its significant nodes’ values of g and h
from Cs. Using the values, we can construct the path P from
vt back to vs step by step (e.g., first vt, and then the parent
of vt, and then the parent of the parent of vt, until the source
vs).
After finishing computing the shortest path tree, Cs then
partially decrypts each g(v) and each h(v), and sends the
partial decrypted ciphertexts to the domain controller of node
v. The domain controller of v also applies partial decryption,
and thus obtains the plaintexts of g(v) and h(v), i.e., dg(v)
and dh(v). Since E() uses (N, 2)-secret sharing, the encrypted
indicators can be decrypted by partial decryption of two
domains.
For any destination vt, the shortest path and corresponding
forwarding table entries are constructed using Algorithm 1
with all plaintext indicators dg() and dh().
If vt is not a significant node, the domain controller Ct
of vt compares all the significant nodes in its domain, for
the sums of their distances from vs and to vt. Suppose the
significant node with the smallest distance sum is v. Then
the intra-domain path from v to vt is chosen as part of the
shortest path from vs to vt, and the forwarding table entries
for destination vt in this part of path are computed and installed
accordingly. The forwarding table entries in the other parts of
the path are computed in a way similar to vt being a significant
node presented below.
If vt is a significant node, the domain controller of vt
decides what to do based on the type of link between vt’s
parent dh(vt) on the shortest path tree and vt in the equivalent
cost graph.
• If the link represents an intra-domain path, i.e., dh(vt)
is another significant node in the destination domain,
the intra-domain path between dh(vt) and vt is picked
as part of the shortest path from vs to vt. The forward-
ing table entries for destination vt in the destination
domain are installed by Ct accordingly.
• If the link is an inter-domain link, the link is added
directly as part of the shortest path from vs to vt.
Ct then sends a message to the domain controller of
dh(vt) and asks it to install a corresponding forward-
ing table entry at switch dh(vt).
Next, the domain controller of the predecessor of the des-
tination domain on the selected shortest path computes the
forwarding table entries similarly. This process is repeated until
the source switch is reached and all forwarding table entries
for destination vt have been computed.
For the example of Figure 1(c), the destination controller
Ct selects v6 as part of the optimal path from vs to vt. It
then installs forwarding entries on switches between vt and v6
and also notifies C1 to install a forwarding table entry at v4,
specifying that packets from vs to vt should be forwarded to
v6 by v4. The routing path can be established by repeating this
process.
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode of the path establish-
ment protocol in Section IV-C.
Algorithm 1 Path Establishment Protocol
Input: All significant nodes’ g and h;
Source node vs and destination node vt;
Output: The shortest path P from vs to vt
1: Cs computes partial decryption PD(g(v)) and
PD′(h(v)), and then sends them to C, the controller of
v.
2: C partially decrypts PD(g(v)) and PD′(h(v)) and gets
the plaintext of g(v) and h(v): dg(v) and dh(v).
3: vt = vt
4: if vt 6∈ S then
5: Let St be the significant node set of Dt
6: vmin = −1, dmin =∞
7: for all v ∈ St do
8: if dg(v) + d(vvt) < dmin then
9: dmin = dg(v) + d(vvt), vmin = v
10: end if
11: end for
12: Add the intra-domain path from vmin to vt to P .
13: Let vt = vmin
14: end if
15: Now we construct the path from vs to vt.
16: while vt 6= vs do
17: if dh(vt) ∈ St {dh(vt) ∼ vt is an intra-domain link}
then
18: Add the intra-domain path from dh(vt) to vt to P .
19: end if
20: if dh(vt) 6∈ St {dh(vt) ∼ vt is an inter-domain link}
then
21: Add dh(vt) ∼ vt to P .
22: end if
23: Let vt = dh(vt)
24: end while
D. Implementation of Secure-If Operations
In this section, we will introduce the implementation of
the three Secure-If operations used in the PSPT construction
protocol.
First, we present a sketch of the Secure-If operation (See
Algorithm 2). Each Secure-If operation needs to construct
three parameters (t0, t1, t2) and a condition satisfied value x
as input. t0 is a condition while t1 and t2 are two options. The
output of Secure-If is t1 when condition is satisfied (t0 = x);
otherwise, the output is t2. Such operation is achieved by an
interactive process between two controllers, say Cs and Ci.
Cs first applies partial decryption to t0 and sends the result
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Algorithm 2 Secure-If Operation Sketch
Input:
x: value when condition is satisfied;
(t0, t1, t2): three parameters.
1: Cs randomly choose a domain controller Ci.
2: Cs computes PD(t0) and sends (PD(t0), t1, t2) to Ci.
{PD() is partial decryption operation}
3: Upon receiving (PD(t0), t1, t2), Ci do partial decryption
on PD(t0) and gets the plaintext dt0 of t0.
4: Ci sends
{
R(t1) if dt0 == x
R(t2) otherwise
back to Cs.
5: Cs gets the result.
PD(t0), together with t1 and t2, to any other domain controller
Ci. Then Ci can fully decrypt t0 and get the plaintext dt0 as the
threshold of secret sharing is 2. Ci verifies whether dt0 is equal
to x and replies one of t1 and t2 (with re-randomization) to
Cs. With the Secure-If operation sketch, we need to show the
construction of (t0, t1, t2) and x when we introduce a Secure-
If operation.
The PSPT construction uses three Secure-If operations
(SecIf0, SecIf1, and SecIf2). As the Secure-If operation
SecIf2 is used in SecIf1, our decryption is in the order of
SecIf0, SecIf2, and SecIf1.
Construction of SecIf0
x in SecIf0 is 1 and (t0, t1, t2) are constructed as follow.
With probability 12 , Cs computes t0 = (
f(v)
f(v′) )
r
, where r
is a randomly picked exponent 2; t1 = E(cmax|S|+ 1); t2 =
R(g(v)+g(v′)+e(vv′)). In this case if f(v) is equal to f(v′),
t0 = 1 = x, hence the function of SecIf0 can be achieved.
With the remaining probability 12 , Cs computes t0 =
( 1f(v)f(v′) )
r
, where r is a randomly picked exponent; t1 =
R(g(v) + g(v′) + e(vv′)); t2 = E(cmax|S| + 1). In this case
if f(v) is not equal to f(v′), t0 = 12∗1/2 = 1 = x, hence the
function of SecIf0 can also be achieved.
The reason for that we use an uncertain calculation is to
protect privacy. If we only apply the first case, any attacker that
decrypts t0 and finds t0 = x can determine that f(v) = f(v′).
However, in the current implementation, even if an attacker
knows t0 = x, it cannot guess whether f(v) = f(v′) as f(v) =
f(v′) and f(v) 6= f(v′) have equal probability.
Construction of SecIf2
x in SecIf2 is 2 and (t0, t1, t2) are constructed as follow.
With probability 12 , Cs computes t0 = R(f(v)).
Let t1, t2 be E′(2−1), R′(f(v)) for the SecIf2 of f(v);
R(α(vv′)), R(g(v)) for g(v); E′(v′), R′(h(v)) for h(v);
R′(f(v′)), E′(2−1) for f(v′); R(g(v′)), R(α(vv′)) for g(v′);
R′(h(v′)), E′(v) for h(v′).
With the remaining probability 12 , t0 = R(
1
f(v) ) and
the above values of t1 and t2 are swapped, i.e., t1, t2 be
R′(f(v)), E′(2−1) for f(v) and so on;
2Assume the plaintext space and the ciphertext space are both the same
cyclic group. The value of r needs to be picked uniformly at random from
between 0 and the order of the group minus 1, including the two endpoints.
Construction of SecIf1
Here we show the construction of x and (t0, t1, t2) in
SecIf1. We first introduce a comparison protocol called osc
which is necessary in SecIf1.
The comparison protocol is designed by us based on the
secure comparison protocol proposed in [20]. The protocol
in [20] takes two ciphertexts of E() as input, and outputs
another ciphertext of E(). The output is E(1) if the first
input’s plaintext is greater than or equal to the second input’s;
otherwise, the output is E(−1). Based on this comparison
protocol, we design a new comparison protocol which can
distinguish not only two edges with different α but also two
edges with the same α by comparing their indexes. Denote the
original comparison operation by sc(). Assume that the two
edges’ α values are a and b and their indexes are aidx and
bidx.
The protocol we designed, osc(a, aidx, b, bidx), is actually
a Secure-If operation. Its x is 1 and (t0, t1, t2) are constructed
as the following paragraph. With x, (t0, t1, t2) and Secure-If
operation sketch, we get the new protocol osc.
First we compute θ = sc(a, b) + sc(b, a) − E(1). If a 6=
b, θ is E(−1); Otherwise θ is E(1). With probability 12 , Cs
computes t0 = θ; t1 is E(1) if aidx < bidx; Otherwise t1
is E(−1); t2 = sc(b, a). With probability 12 , Cs computes
t0 = −θ; t1 = sc(b, a); t2 is E(1) if aidx < bidx; Otherwise
t2 is E(−1).
With the secure comparison, Cs can compare each α value
(except α(vv′) itself) with α(vv′). Denote by βi the output of
the protocol. Suppose that there are ζ such outputs in total. Cs
computes γ =
∑
i βi, and uses the secure comparison protocol
again, to compare γ with E(ζ). Let ǫ be the output. With ǫ,
we can easily construct t0, t1, t2 of SecIf1.
The construction of SecIf1 is shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Construction of SecIf1
Output: x and (t0, t1, t2).
1: Denote by m the total link number in the equivalent cost
graph.{the link number is equal to the number of all α
values.}
2: Assume the index of α(vv′) is k.
3: γ = E(0),ζ = m− 1
4: for i = 1 to m do
5: Assume the ith link is v1 ∼ v2.
6: if k 6= i{v1 ∼ v2 6= v ∼ v′} then
7: γ = γ + osc(α(vv′), k, α(v1v2), i).
8: end if
9: end for
10: ǫ = osc(γ,E(ζ)).
11: Let ta be the result of SecIf2.
12: Let tb be :
tb =< R
′(f(v)), R(g(v)), R′(h(v)),
R′(f(v′)), R(g(v′)), R′(h(v′)) >
13: Cs computes:{
t0 = ǫ, t1 = ta, t2 = tb;with probability
1
2 ,
t0 = −ǫ, t1 = tb, t2 = ta;with probability
1
2
14: x = 1.
15: Cs gets x and (t0, t1, t2).
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V. PROTOCOL OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we introduce two optimization methods of
PYCRO. The first method reduces the number of shortest path
tree computing for different flows. The second method reduces
the computing time of each shortest path tree, called PYCRO
with Candidate Recommendation (PYCRO-CR). Combining
these two, the efficiency of PYCRO can be significantly
improved.
A. Shared Shortest Path Tree
For all flows transmitted from a domain Ds, it is highly
possible that another domain will treat these flows or a large
subset of these flows using the same access and routing policy.
We define an equal-flow group G as a group of flows from the
same domain such that for all flows in G, any other domain
D will treat them using the same access and routing policy
and hence provide the same paths between any two gateways
of D. Therefore all flows in G can use a number of shared
shortest path trees.
A source domain with k gateway switches maintains k
shared shortest path trees for each equal-flow group. Each
of the trees is rooted at a gateway switch. To compute each
shared shortest path tree, the nodes of the equivalent cost graph
include gateway switches (significant nodes) of all domains.
Correspondingly, when constructing links in the equivalent cost
graph, for any two significant nodes v and v′ (v 6= v′), we
distinguish two cases:
• Case 1: v and v′ belong to the same domain, then
there is a link in the equivalent cost graph between
those two nodes, and the cost of this link is d(vv′),
which is only known to the domain of v and v′.
• Case 2: v and v′ belong to different domains, If there
is an inter-domain link between v and v′, then there
is a link in the equivalent cost graph between those
two nodes, and the cost of this link is c(vv′). If there
is no such inter-domain link then there is no link in
the equivalent cost graph between these two nodes.
Then the algorithm in Section IV-B can be run to build each
shared shortest path tree.
When the source controller receives a flow query from
the source vs to destination vt. For each gateway switch vi
in the source domain, the source controller Cs computes the
encrypted distance from vs to vi plus the distance from vi to a
gateway w in the destination domain on the shared tree rooted
at vi. Thus for any w, there are k potential paths from vs to
w. Suppose the destination domain has k′ gateways. Then Cs
simply sends all k · k′ path lengths, with partial encryption,
to the destination controller Ct. Ct can determine the shortest
path from vs to vt and install forwarding entries using the
method similar to that in Section IV-C.
For example in Figure 1(a), both Ds and Dt have two
gateways. Hence for a group of flows from Ds, Ds can
maintains two PSPTs rooted at v1 and v2. There are at most
2 × 2 = 4 shortest paths between Ds and Dt, and Ds can
select one of them for each flow. Due to space limit, we do
not present further details of path selection and forwarding
entry installation in other domains.
B. PYCRO with Candidate Recommendation
The complexity of the shortest path tree algorithm pre-
sented in Section IV-B is mainly due to the number of calls
of Secure-If operations to select the smallest α(vv′) among
the α values of all links in the equivalent cost graph and the
inefficiency of the secure comparison operation. To reduce the
number of calls of Secure-If operations, we propose to use
candidate recommendation to let the other domain recommend
potential nodes that may have the smallest α value(i.e.,the
smallest α value in its domain). As for the inefficiency of the
secure comparison operation, we replace it with the Damgard-
Geisler-Kroigard (DGK) secure comparison protocol, a more
efficient protocol proposed in [7].3 Unlike the secure compari-
son we used in Section IV-B, the input and output of the DGK
protocol are plaintexts. Suppose there are two parties A and
B. A has a number a and B has a number b. A and B can
run the DGK protocol to compare a and b without revealing
a(b) to party B(A).
After constructing the equivalent cost graph and adding the
source node vs into the shortest path tree with g(vs) = E(0).
The source domain controller Cs broadcasts vs and g(vs) to all
other domain controllers. Then, the domains repeat the three
interactive steps below for |S| − 1 times:
Step 1. Each domain Di finds its significant node that is
not in the shortest path tree and the path length to the root is
the shortest in Di. Di also records the node’s parent and its
path length. We call the node selected by Di a candidate node
vi. Besides, a domain controller C0 (specified by the source
controller Cs) sends the information g(v0) and h(v0) of its
candidate node v0 to Cs.
Step 2. The source controller Cs should then find out the
candidate node whose path length to vs is the shortest. Cs
temporarily sets v0 as the shortest-distance node u ← v0.
For each candidate node vi except v0: Controller Cs sends
a message including g(u) to vi’s controller Ci. Ci then runs
DGK secure comparison protocol to compare g(u) and the path
length of candidate node vi. Once the DGK protocol finishes,
Ci tells Cs the result of the comparison. According to the
result, if the plaintext of g(u) is less than that of g(vi), Ci
then updates u← vi.
Step 3. After the two steps above, the controller Cs get the
shortest-distance node u. Next, Cs requests the controller of
u’s domain for the information of g(u) and h(u) and add u
into the shortest path tree under its parent. Cs broadcasts the
new shortest path tree with encrypted distance information to
the other domains.
After |S| − 1 iterations of the above loop, Cs finishes the
computing of the shortest path tree.
VI. BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION
Bandwidth allocation has been applied to practical traffic
engineering solutions such as B4 [15]. We solves a relatively
simple version of the bandwidth allocation problem. Before
we define the problem, we introduce some preliminaries.
3Using DGK, we make a small sacrifice of privacy for efficiency. However,
it’s worth since only a little information is revealed.
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Besides the link cost, every link vv′ also has a bandwidth
b(v, v′). b(v, v′) represents the maximum bandwidth that link
vv′ can provide. And the definition of the cost of a flow on a
path is:
Definition 1: Given a path p from node v to node v′ whose
length is lp, if a flow f consumes bandwidth bf on p, then the
cost of f on p is is c(f, p) = bf · lp.
A flow f has a bandwidth demand qf . However as link
bandwidth is limited, it may need multiple paths to satisfy a
flow’s bandwidth demand [15]. We assume a flow can be split
to multiple subflows to be transmitted on different paths. And
the cost of f is defined as:
Definition 2: The cost of f for bandwidth allocation is the
sum of path cost Σbf · lP for p ∈ P where P is the set of
paths that f is split on.
Given Definition 1 and Definition 2,we define the Band-
width Allocation problem as follows:
Definition 3: Bandwidth Allocation:for any flow f with
bandwidth demand qf , we should find k paths such that the
sum of allocated bandwidth of these paths to f is no less than
the bandwidth demand qf and the routing cost of f should be
minimized.
We design a bandwidth allocation protocol of PYCRO,
named PYCRO-BA, works in the following steps:
Step 1. During the construction of the equivalent cost
graph, each domain controller assigns an available bandwidth
b(v, v′) amount between two significant nodes v and v′, which
is also encrypted by a homomorphic encryption system.
Step 2. The source controller creates the shortest path tree
and finds the shortest path p from the source vs to destination
vt using the protocol presented earlier.
Step 3. The source controller determines the available
bandwidth bp on the shortest path, which is the minimum value
of b(v, v′) for all links (v, v′) on the paths. This process is
similar to the previous protocol to determine the minimum
cost candidate. We skip the protocol details here and have
implemented them in the experiments.
Step 4. If bp is smaller than the bandwidth demand q, Cs
computes a residual demand q − bp and find another path to
satisfy the demand.
Step 5. Cs deletes all links of p from the equivalent cost
graph, and repeats Steps 2-4 to find more paths until the
bandwidth demand is satisfied.
The above bandwidth allocation protocol requires multi-
ple calls of the shortest path tree protocol. To improve its
efficiency, Cs may find multiple disjoint paths to different
gateways of the destination domain and suggest these paths
to the destination controller Ct. If Ct can also find multiple
disjoint paths from different gateways to vt, multiple paths
can be established by a single call of the shortest path tree
protocol. We plan to develop more sophisticated protocol to
optimize this process in future work.
VII. PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF PYCRO
We analyze the privacy-preserving property of PYCRO in
a standard cryptographic model, the semihonest model [10],
which is widely used in the literature (e.g., [29] and [3]).
In this model, all involved parties are assumed to follow
the protocol faithfully, although they may attempt to violate
privacy using the information they obtain. Note that such
an assumption is acceptable in our scenario of cross-domain
routing, because domain controllers usually have long-term
relationship with each other. Despite their curiosity about
others’ private information, it is uncommon for them to deviate
from the protocol just in order to violate others’ privacy.
The main result we get as shown in Proposition 4 below,
is that PYCRO only leaks to each domain controller its
significant nodes’ distances from the source node and parents
nodes in the shortest path tree. We stress that this leaked
distance information is about a small number of pairs of nodes
only. Any other information, including distances between other
pairs of nodes, are protected by PYCRO. Furthermore, our
protection is cryptographically strong, i.e., no partial knowl-
edge about the protected information is leaked by PYCRO.
In contrast, the performance cost we pay for the privacy
protection is very reasonable. The execution time varies among
different topologies, from seconds to tens of seconds (please
see Section VIII for details).
Proposition 4: PYCRO is weakly privacy preserving in the
semihonest model, in the sense that it reveals to each domain
controller no more than its significant nodes’ distances from
the source node and parent nodes in the shortest path tree.
The basic idea of our proof is to demonstrate a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator according to the definition and
proof methodologies of cryptographic protocols discussed in
[10].
Proof Sketch: Due to limit of space, we only provide a proof
sketch. Some details are skipped.
Our proof is established by demonstrating a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator according to the definition and
proof methodologies of cryptographic protocols discussed in
[10].
For each domain controller Ci, we construct a simulator for
its view, which takes as input its significant nodes’ distances
from the source node and parent nodes in the shortest path
tree. All coin flips in the view can be easily simulated, and
thus we focus on generating simulated messages below.
If Ci 6= Cs, the simulator simulates the messages received
from Cs for each of its significant node, using two ciphertexts.
The first ciphertext is an encrypted distance of the significant
node from the source node, where the cryptosystem used is
E() and the key used is Ci’s own public key. The second
ciphertext is an encrypted identity of the significant node’s
parent node in the shortest path tree, where the cryptosystem
used is E′() and the key used is still Ci’s public key.
For C1, we add the following simulated messages. In the
Secure-If operation SecIf0, the messages from Cs is simulated
using three ciphertexts. The first of these three is under E′(),
with the plaintext being 1 with probability 12 , or a uniformly
random number with probability 12 . The remaining two are
encryptions of random plaintexts under E(). The public key
used for encryption of all these three is C1’s own public key.
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For the Secure-If operation SecIf1 and SecIf2, the simu-
lator goes as follows. For SecIf2, the messages from Cs are
simulated using 8 random ciphertexts under E′() and 4 random
ciphertexts under E(), and also another ciphertext under E′()
with the plaintext being 2 or 12 , each with probability
1
2 , where
the public key used for encryption is C1’s own public key. For
SecIf1, in addition to simulating the received messages in the
executions of secure comparison, the simulator simulates the
earlier round of message from Cs using three ciphertexts under
E(), with the first being an encrypted 1 or encrypted −1, each
with probability 12 , where the public key used for encryption
is C1’s own public key. The remaining two ciphertexts are
randomly generated. The simulator simulates the later round
of message from Cs using 8 random ciphertexts under E′() and
4 random ciphertexts under E(), and also another ciphertext
under E() being an encrypted 1 or encrypted −1, each with
probability 12 , where the public key used for encryption is C1’s
own public key.
For Cs, the simulator goes as follows. First, it simulates
the first round messages from other domain controllers using
random ciphertexts. For each pair of significant nodes in any
other domain, there should be a random ciphertext under the
cryptosystem E(). Then the simulator proceeds to simulate
the message received from C1 in the Secure-If operation
SecIf0. This should again be a random ciphertext under the
cryptosystem E().
The Secure-If operation SecIf1 and SecIf2 are more
complicated. For SecIf2, the messages from C1 can be
simulated by using 4 random ciphertexts under cryptosystem
E′() and 2 random ciphertexts under cryptosystem E(). For
SecIf1, in addition to simulating the received messages in
the executions of secure comparison, the simulator simulates
the earlier message from C1 using a random ciphertext, being
E(1) with probability 12 and E(−1) with probability
1
2 .
The final messages from C1 are simulated using 4 random
ciphertexts under E′() and 2 random ciphertexts under E().
✷
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The most significant concern of a privacy-preserving pro-
tocol is its computation and communication efficiency. In this
section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the efficiency of
PYCRO protocols. We have implemented a prototype system
on seven Dell PowerEdge R720 servers with Linux operation
systems. All servers are connected via a campus network.
Each machine runs a program to emulate a controller. If the
controller number is larger than seven, we may run multiple
threads on a single machine. We configure the controller
placement such that two neighboring controllers are in different
machines. In all experiments, cryptographical operations are
implemented using the Crypto++ library [6].
We use the router-level topologies of seven real ISP net-
works collected by the Rocketfuel project [26]. The detailed
information of the seven networks can be found in Table I
and networks are identified as I to VII. Based on topology
analysis, we set a number of routers as gateways. Based on
the seven networks, we construct 30 multi-domain topologies
in six groups as shown in Table II. For example, topologies
1 to 5 are constructed using the same domains I and II, but
have different number of gateways and inter-domain links in
Table I. INFORMATION OF THE SEVEN ROCKETFUEL TOPOLOGIES
Network ID Network name # routers # links # gateways
I AS 1221 318 758 231
II AS 1239 604 2268 242
III AS 1755 172 381 61
IV AS 2914 960 2821 507
V AS 3257 240 404 89
VI AS 3967 201 434 110
VII AS 7018 631 2078 246
Table II. INFORMATION OF MULTI-DOMAIN TOPOLOGIES.
Topo ID # domains domains # inter-d links # gateways
1− 5 2 I,II 10− 100 21− 165
6− 10 3 I to III 10− 100 21− 158
11− 15 4 IV to VII 10− 100 21− 177
16− 20 5 I,III,V to VII 10− 100 21− 174
21− 25 6 I to VI 10− 100 21− 177
26− 30 7 I to VII 10− 100 21− 185
an increasing order. Gateways are randomly selected from the
gateways routers of the Rocketfuel networks.
Computation cost. We first conduct experiments to con-
struct shortest path trees on every topology. For each topology,
we randomly select 20 nodes and construct a shortest path tree
for each of them. By computing time, we mean the average
execution time of the protocol for one shortest path tree. We
find that the computing times for different nodes in a same
topology vary very little. It is because the execution time
mainly depends on the number of domains, number of inter-
domain links, and number of gateways. Figure 2 shows the
average execution time of PYCRO on different topologies.
The deviations are too small to be shown in the figure. We
find that, for topologies consisting of the same domains (e.g.,
topologies 1-5), the execution time increases linearly with the
number of inter-domain links and number of gateways. By
comparing topologies of different domains, the execution time
also increases linearly with the number of domains. In general
PYCRO is very efficient: it takes a short time to compute a
shortest path tree on a topology with thousands of switches
and links in a privacy-preserving manner. Since a shortest path
tree can be shared with multiple paths and the response to a
path query takes much less time. Specially, if we have got a
shortest path tree rooted at vs, the paths that start from vs to
any destination can be constructed easily and quickly using
the Algorithm 1.
We then conduct experiments to evaluate the execution time
of the bandwidth allocation protocol. We assign every link
a random capacity from 1 to 5. In each experiment, we set
the bandwidth demand as 20 and find multiple paths between
the sender and destination to satisfy the bandwidth demand.
This bandwidth demand can be considered as the aggregated
demand of all flows in the sender switch. For each topology
we perform 20 runs and compute the average. The results
are shown in Figure 3. We find that there is no strict linear
dependency of the execution time and number of inter-domain
links, because more inter-domain links also make it easier to
find multiple disjoint paths at a shortest path tree.
Communication cost. We then show the communication
cost of PYCRO in the average size of all messages per domain
and plot the results in Figures 4 and 5. We observe that the
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Figure 5. Communication cost of
PYCRO bandwidth allocation
communication cost also increases with the number of do-
mains, number of inter-domain links, and number of gateways.
Each domain spends less than 700 KB to compute a shortest
path tree and less than 1 MB to allocate bandwidth for the
largest topology. For other topologies the communication cost
is much less. In general, PYCRO is communication efficient.
Comparison with other solutions. It is hard to find an
existing work achieving the same objectives as PYCRO. It is
non-trivial to apply existing secure multi-party computation
such as Fairplay [17] and SEPIA [4] to the problems of this
paper.
A cross-domain privacy-preserving protocol for quantifying
network reachability is proposed in [5]. From their experi-
mental results, we find that about 400 or 550 seconds offline
computation cost, about 5 or 25 seconds online computation
cost and about 450 or 2100 KB communication cost are needed
for every party on average in their synthetic data. In our
experiments of optimized protocol of PYCRO, even the biggest
network requires only 32.3/7 = 4.61 seconds and 687.78/7 =
98.25 KB for each domain in average. In [17], a full-fledged
system called Fairplay that implements generic secure function
evaluation is introduced. Their experimental results show that
it takes 1.41 second to make a comparison. In our optimized
protocol, (|S|−1)(n−1) comparison operations are needed in
total, where |S| is the significant node number (from tens to
hundreds) and n is the domain number(from 2 to 7). Hence,
if we apply Fairplay to our protocol, the average comparison
operation time of each domain is 1.41(|S|−1)(n−1) seconds.
For a case |S| = 185 and n = 7, the average comparison time
of each domain is 222.38 seconds while the average time that
PYCRO consumes in each domain is 4.61 seconds.
In summary, PYCRO can improve the time and bandwidth
efficiency by an order of magnitude for cross-domain routing
optimization, compared to existing solutions.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present PYCRO, the first privacy-
preserving cross-domain routing optimization protocol in SDN
environments. We develop a new cryptographic tool named the
Secure-If operation and apply it with homomorphic encryption
to compute the shortest cross-domain paths without revealing
private information. PYCRO also provides bandwidth allo-
cation, a fundamental traffic engineering solution. We have
implemented PYCRO in a prototype system and performed
real experiments to demonstrate its efficiency. Experimental
results show that PYCRO can improve the time and bandwidth
efficiency by an order of magnitude compared to general-
purpose solutions. In future we will design more complex
routing optimization functions based on PYCRO. We believe
our study may lead to useful discussion of the same problem
for the Internet.
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